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ABSTRACT
Inducing commitment: is an important concern for executives
attempting to implement strategies. In this paper, the author develops
a model of the process by which executives can encourage commitment in
contributors through the promotion of specific cognitive heuristics and
biases. Three specific hypotheses from this model are tested within
Staw's (1981) escalating commitment framework.
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INTRODUCTION
The topic of organizational commitment is of increasing interest
to management theorists. In addition to the many popular books which
discuss the importance of commitment (Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Ouchi,
1981; Peters and Waterman, 1982), there is a long stream of academic
work on the subject.
Salancik (1977) defines commitment as "a state of being in which
an individual becomes bound by his actions and through these actions
to beliefs that sustain the activities and his own involvement." And
states, "Commitment is what makes us like what we do and continue doing
it, even when the payoffs are not obvious" (1977, p. 62). Unlike the
authors of many of the popular works dealing with commitment, Salancik
notes that high levels of commitment can have negative consequences if
a person or group is committed to the wrong course of action.
This perspective is shared by Staw (1981). He cites several
examples, including the Vietnam War, in which high levels of commitment
to organizations prevented decision makers from recognizing errors and
tended to prolong failing courses of action. Staw's own research on
"escalating commitment" (much of it summarized in his 1981 article) has
helped to identify some of the conditions under which commitment to a
failing course of action is likely to be strongest.
Creating commitment is one of the essential functions of leader-
ship or, in Barnard's terms, one of the critical "functions of the
executive" (1968, p. 230). Throughout this paper, the word "executive
will be used to denote those people in new or established organiza-
tions who take the leadership role and guide the organization in the
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achievement of its strategic mission. In an uncertain and changing
environment, an executive must convince others to contribute their
resources (money, effort, etc.) to a course of action which is based on
the executive's assumptions about the outcomes the course of action
will produce. The ability to do this depends on some of the traits
Bennis (1983) identified a study of 80 Chief Executive Officers and ten
innovative leaders.
1. Vision : The capacity to create and communicate a compelling
vision of a desired state of affairs—to impart clarity to
this vision (or paradigm, context, frame—all those words
serve) and induce commitment to it.
2. Communication and alignment : The capacity to communicate
their vision in order to gain the support of their multiple
constituencies.
3. Persistence, consitency, focus : The capacity to maintain the
organization's direction, especially when the going gets
rough.
Bennis, 1983, p. 18.
The executive must create confidence in contributors that the course of
action will be successful and that he is in control of outcomes.
Throughout this paper, the word "contributors" will be used to refer to
those individuals and institutions who's contributions of resources are
necessary for a particular course of action to succeed. Investors must
contribute money, employees must contribute their time, effort, and
expertise, governments must sanction the venture and often contribute
to it financially.
Discussions of the creation of commitment often focus on the
affective or attitudinal dimension of commitment. Identification with
the organization or leader is discussed; motivation to achieve the
organization's or leader's goals, and so forth. However, there is also
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a cognitive dimension to commitment, as is emphasized in Salancik's
definition.
The discipline of behavioral decision theory can contribute to the
understanding of organizational commitment through a treatment of the
decision process involved in commitment. Much of the research in
behavioral decision theory rests on the observation that human beings
are limited in their ability to process information (Simon, 1976).
Researchers in this area have identified a number of biases which result
from cognitive limitations and heuristics
,
simplifying strategies or
"rules of thumb," which people commonly use to reduce the amount of in-
formation they must consider in decision-making. These biases and
heuristics form the basis of a model of the means by which commitment
to a course of action may be created and maintained. The basic assump-
tion underlying this model is that information may be manipulated by
executives to encourage particular types of simplifying heuristics or
biases in contributors in order to increase their confidence in a
course of action and their commitment to it.
Much has been written about the separate impacts of individual
cognitive heuristics and biases on managerial decision-making (Schwenk,
1984; Duhaime and Schwenk (forthcoming); Taylor, 1975; Nisbett and
Ross, 1980; Hogarth, 1980; Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981). However,
individual biases may interact with each other in organizational deci-
sions involving multiple contributors who's cooperation and commitment
is necessary for the organization to act. In this paper, a model of
this interaction is developed and some of its implications are tested
in a laboratory experiment.
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IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT AND COGNITIVE SIMPLIFICATION
The literature on self-presentation (Goffman, 1959) and impression
management (Schlinker, 1980) contains some useful insights about tech-
niques which executives may use to manipulate heuristics and biases.
These include various types of self-description designed to match the
speaker's values to those of his audience, fulfill audience stereotypes,
and to create impressions of the speaker's unique competence (Schlinker,
1980, pp. 178-193). They also include the use of personal appearance
and the creation of appropriate surroundings (through the use of props
and scenery) to create certain impressions in the audience (Schlenker,
1980, pp. 267-271).
However, those writing on impression management have not tied this
process to the promotion of cognitive heuristics and biases. In this
paper the link will be drawn between impression management and the pro-
motion of specific cognitive biases which influence potential contribu-
tors' decisions and commitment. In the next sections, one heuristic
(representativeness) and two biases (overconfidence and illusion of
executive control) will be described and their role in promoting esca-
lating commitment and entrapment will be discussed.
Vivid Anecdotal Information and Pallid Statistical Information :
Encouraging the Representativeness Heuristic
Potential contributors to a course of action must decide whether
its chances of success are great enough to justify their Investment of
money or time. In making this decision, there are often many types of
information which may be used, Including statistical information and
vivid anecdotal information. There is evidence from business failures,
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from observation of Investment decision-making, and from laboratory
experiments that people tend to give too much weight to vivid anec-
dotal information about executives or companies and too little to
pallid statistical information (Borgida and Nisbett, 1977). Potential
contributors may use vivid personal information to decide whether an
executive or a company has qualities which represent the potential for
success. They then use this assessment as the basis for their contri-
bution decision.
Nisbett and Ross (1980, pp. 25-26) illustrate this process with the
following example and discussion of the representativeness heuristic:
The present authors have a friend who Is a professor.
He likes to write poetry, is rather shy, and is small
in stature. Which of the following is his field:
(a) Chinese studies or (b) psychology?
Those readers who quickly and confidently predicted
"psychology" probably applied some version, whether
sophisticated or crude, of conventional statistical
canons. We congratulate these readers. We suspect,
however, that many readers guessed "Chinese studies,"
or at least seriously considered that such a guess
might be reasonable. If so, they probably were
seduced by the representativeness heuristic. Speci-
fically, they assessed the relative "goodness of
fit" between the professor's personality profile
and the predominant features of their stereotypes
of Sinologists and psychologists. Finding the fit
better for the former than for the latter, they
guessed the professor's field to be Chinese studies.
In succumbing to the lure of the representativeness
heuristic, what the reader likely has overlooked
or not appreciated is some relevant category base-
rate information. Let the reader who guessed
"Chinese studies" now reconsider that guess In
light of the relative numbers of psychologists and
Sinologists in the population.
According to Nisbett and Ross, the statistical information which
most readers possess about the relative frequency of the two occupations
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is likely to be ignored if the anecdotal information is vivid and
salient . They cite numerous experimental demonstrations of the biasing
effects of vivid anecdotal information (1980, pp. 55-61). Hogarth
(1980, pp. 31-33) suggests that if this anecdotal information is con-
sistent or presents a consistent picture, it may discourage decision-
makers from seeking other information.
Martin and Powers (1983) examined the effects of a vivid anecdote
compared to statistical information deaing with the sincerity of a
hypothetical company's policy of avoiding layoffs. MBAs given a vivid
story of one employee's positive experience with the policy expressed
more belief in the policy and commitment to the organization than those
given statistics supporting the truthfulness of the policy.
It may be that investors in the DeLorean Motor Company fell prey to
the representativeness heuristic. In this case statistical information
for assessing the probable success of the new venture did exist.
Hillel Levin, in his book Grand Delusions: The Cosmic Career of John
DeLorean (1983, p. 163-165) points out that there have been numerous
attempts by entrepreneurs to enter the American automobile market. The
last successful attempt had been by Walter Chrysler in 1924. Since
then, many new autos like Kaisecfrazer and the Tucker had failed. In
1974, Malcom Bricklin had produced a two-seat safety-oriented sports
car with gull-wing doors similar to DeLorean 's. His company, financed
partly by the Canadian government, had produced only 3000 cars over a
period of a year before it failed. However, the investors, who lost an
estimated $120 million in the venture, generally did not discuss these
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statistics in describing their reasons for investing but instead
focused on John DeLorean's personal characteristics.
There is evidence that John DeLorean attempted to increase the
salience of information about himself to encourage a kind of represen-
tativeness heuristic which reduced contributors' motivation to seek out
and use other types of data. According to Levin:
For DeLorean, the impressive stack of press
clippings was a potent weapon. No other entrepre-
neur in business history used publicity as well
in amassing his seed capital, and he found that
investors were as unlikely to look behind his
hollow hype as reporters. In the skewed double
standards of high finance, DeLorean underwent
only the most cursory check into his background
before he was loaned hundreds of millions of
dollars. If there had been anything small-time
about DeLorean, the banks and the British govern-
ment might have persevered in turning up the
business failures and court cases that followed
his resignation from General Motors. (Levin
,
1983, p. 323)
According to Levin, DeLorean's activities had the effect of creating
tremendous confidence in bankers (p. 149), individual investors (p.
167-173, see quote 172), the British government (who provided financing
for the plant in Ireland) conservative automobile dealers (p. 177-178),
and employees (pp. 172-174). The news media was generally very lauda-
tory towards DeLorean and did not report several expensive failing ven-
tures in which DeLorean had been involved prior to the DeLorean Motor
Company (these are reported in painful detail by Levine in pp. 101-139
of his book).
Dreman (1979, pp. 92-93) cites evidence for the operation of this
heuristic in securities analysts' selection of promising stocks. He
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contends that by providing large amounts of company-specific infor-
mation, companies can induce investment advisors to use this heuristic
when making recommendations on stock, purchases. He cites an example of
one analyst so knowledgable about the Clorox company that "he could
recite bleach share by brand in every small town in the Southwest."
However, this specific company information lead the analyst to ignore
other information relevant to the company's stock's performance. He
was unable to forecast the decline in the price from a high of 53 to
11.
Information Volume and Overconfidence
Anecdotal information may influence decision-makers' level of con-
fidence in their choices as well as the choices themselves. The amount
of information provided appears to be the factor which determines
whether the information will lead to overconfidence. The effects of
overconfidence have not yet been demonstrated in strategic decisions.
However, they have been observed in other decisions of consequence.
Though this tendency toward overconfidence exists in a wide variety of
decisions, perhaps the most striking evidence comes from the study of
investment decision-making.
Securities analysts possess large volumes of information on par-
ticular industries and companies, particularly those highly visible
companies which are actively traded. However, Dreman (1979) provides
extensive documentation to support the claim that the additional infor-
mation on highly visible stocks does not allow securities analysts to
develop more accurate forecasts of the performance of these companies
or their stocks. He cites a number of studies (1979, pp. 142-149)
-9-
involving one-year earnings forecasts for over 800 companies altogether,
show average forecast errors of over 14% overall. One study (Richards,
Benjamin, and Strawser, 1977) examined the accuracy of earnings fore-
casts for companies across industries with different levels of visibil-
ity and found that the forecast accuracy was actually slightly worse
for high visibility industries like office equipment & computers and
retail stores than for companies in low visibility industries such as
paper companies and banks.
A study by Cragg and Malkiel (1968) demonstrates the difficulty in
using large volumes of company specific information. Dreman describes
the results in this way:
The two professors studied the earnings projections
of large groups of security analysts working for
five important and highly respected investment
organizations, including two major New York City
bank trust departments, a mutual fund, and an
investment advisory firm. Estimates were made
for 185 companies for periods of from one to five
years. The researchers found that most analysts'
estimates were simply linear extrapolations of
current trends, and that the correlations between
the actual and the predicted earnings turned out
to be very low . Cragg and Malkiel state that in
spite of the vast amount of additional informa-
tion analysts have, supplemented by frequent
company visits, estimates are based on a continuum
of past trends: "The remarkable conclusion of the
present study is that the careful estimates of
security analysts ... performed little better than
those of (past) company growth rates." (Dreman,
1979, 147)
Finally, Dreman reports on the performance of favorite stocks
selected by groups of professional investors and investment advisors
(1979, pp. 250-252). These stocks tended to be the ones with the
highest visibility in the years each survey was conducted. He collected
information from 51 surveys involving over 6,500 participants during
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the years from 1929 to 1976. In short, the stocks selected in these
surveys did not show spectacularly good performance in the 12 months
following the survey. Rather the stocks selected in 77% of these sur-
veys underperf ormed the market (the S&P 500). Since this result is
significantly worse than the results which would be predicted from a
random selection of stocks, high visibility appears not to give an
advantage in the prediction of stock performance. Dreraan concludes
that increased information merely increases investor's and advisor's
overconf idence in their ability to predict a company's stock's perfor-
mance without increasing the accuracy of prediction.
Overconfidence has also been demonstrated in other decisions of
consequence. Oskamp (1962) in a study examining clinical case diagno-
ses by professional psychologists and students of psychology, showed
that accuracy of diagnosis did not increase significantly as more case
information was provided. However, confidence in judgment did increase
dramatically as more information was provided. Apparently, more
information allows people to generate more reasons to justify their
decisions and hence increases their confidence.
A number of researchers have examined overconfidence in laboratory
contexts (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1977; Einhorn and
Hogarth, 1978; Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff, 1980; Oskamp, 1962),
Following Tversky & Kahneman (1974), Fischhoff et al. (1977) suggested
that peoples' level of confidence may be determined by the availability
of reasons for confidence in memory. By increasing the salience of
reasons for success of a venture, executives can increase their avail-
ability in memory.
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Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) suggest that it is difficult for
decision-makers to seek out and use information to disconfirra their
beliefs or positions on issues (1978, pp. 396-399). They also note
that confidence tends to rise with experience in particular types of
decisions because confidence is a function of the number of successful
similar decisions available in memory. However, accuracy of judgment
may not increase with experience (1978, p. 395).
Koriat, et al. (1980) showed that considering reasons for a choice
that they made increased subjects' overconf idence in the correctness of
this choice. As will be shown in the next section, the information
provided to contributors by executives can provide such reasons which
will increase overconfidence.
The Illusion of Executive Control
Langer (1983, pp. 59-90) discusses a bias which affects people's
assessments of their chance of success at a venture. This bias is
called the illusion of control. She reports on six studies which
show that subjects making a variety of decisions expressed an expec-
tancy of personal success higher than the objective probability would
warrant. They tend to overestimate their skill or the impact it will
have on the outcome.
Langer suggests that we are subject to this illusion of personal
control because of the way we collect information. She notes that as
people constantly seek ways to control outcomes in the environment,
they form hypotheses about the effects of their actions on these out-
comes. In her words, they then "tend to seek out information that
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supports their hypotheses while innocently ignoring dis confirming evi-
dence" (1983, p. 24). Nisbett and Ross (1980) cite evidence which
supports Langer's claim. This type of information search, of course
tends to reinforce the illusion of personal control.
Executives interested in increasing contributors 1 commitment may
encourage a similar process by selectively providing information which
suggests that executives are in control of outcomes. There is evi-
dence of such selective use of information from letters to shareholders
in annual reports. These letters focus on statements about the actions
of management and the causal links between these actions and positive
environmental outcomes (Salancik and Meindl, 1984, p. 251). To quote
Salancik and Meindl, "The extent of this tendency cannot be exagger-
ated: Managements were three times more likely to acclaim their
contributions to the firm's good fortune than they were to make any
other causal statement" (1984, p. 251). This serves to promote what
Salancik and Meindl call "the illusion of managerial control." Even
when a company's performance has been poor, its letters to shareholders
generally contain little information about negative environmental
impacts on performance. Management tends not to lay blame on the
environment for failures because this draws shareholders' attention
toward the influence of the environment and weakens the illusion of
managerial control.
Escalating Commitment and Entrapment
As was mentioned earlier in the paper, a high level of commitment
can be dangerous. If the executive's course of action is mistaken,
then the biases and heuristics he encourages may result in escalating
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commitment or entrapment in a failing course of action. The phenome-
non of escalating commitment has received a good deal of research
attention, though it has not previously been tied to the use of infor-
mation to create cognitive biases.
Many difficult personal and organizational decisions involve an
initial commitment of resources (time, effort, money, etc.) followed
by results which suggest initial failure and a need for additional
commitment which may save the venture. In such situations decision-
makers must determine whether or not to commit the extra resources and
risk "throwing good money (or effort) after bad." Examples provided
by Duhaime and Schwenk (forthcoming) and Staw (1981) show that indivi-
duals, businesses, and countries sometimes continue to commit large
resources to failing projects despite continued negative feedback. In
retrospect, one wonders how this "escalating commitment" to these ill-
fated ventures could have continued. A number of studies have dealt
with this question.
Staw (1981) has summarized several studies and used them to devel-
op a theoretical model of the variable affecting the commitment pro-
cess. Staw (1976) used a business case in which study participants
play the role of a corporate financial officer who is asked to allocate
research and development funds to one of two operating divisions of a
company. Subjects were then given feedback on their initial decision
(either positive or negative, indicating success or failure) and asked
to make a further allocation of R&D funds. Staw (1976) found that
more funds were allocated after failure than after success. He also
found that more funds were allocated when the subject was personally
-Ir-
responsible for the decision, by virtue of having made the initial
decision, than when the earlier decision had been made by someone
else.
Three subsequent studies used similar laboratory tasks (Staw and
Fox, 1977; Staw and Ross, 1978; Fox and Staw, 1979). Staw and Ross
(1978) used a laboratory task involving a loan for a development pro-
ject and found effects due to information regarding the cause of the
setback. Subjects allocated more funds when the indicated cause was
exogenous to the program (unlikely to persist into the future) than
when there was an endogenous cause (one likely) to continue). They
also responded more strongly to this information after failure than
after success.
Conlon and Wolf (1980), using Staw and Ross's (1978) development
loan task, collected information on the problem-solving strategy of
subjects. They found that subjects using a calculating strategy
responded differently to information on the likelihood of the cause of
the initial failure persisting into the future than did subjects who
used a non-calculating strategy. Calculators did not retain as much
commitment as non-calculators in the face of information indicating a
long term cause of failure. This suggests that the way decision-makers
frame and approach a decision may determine the likelihood they will
escalate commitment.
Another line of research deals with psychological entrapment, a
process which is essentially the same as escalating commitment. Teger
(1980) discussed conditions under which decision-makers become en-
trapped because they feel they have "too much invested to quit."
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Brockner, Shaw, and Rubin (1979) showed chat subjects invested more
when they had to make an explicit decision to terminate a series of
investments than when the series was self-terminating. They also
invested less if they set a limit on their investment and informed the
experimenter of it before the experiment began.
Brockner, Rubin, and Lang (1981) found that entrapment was greater
when subjects were informed of the advantages of investing a large
amount than when they were given the virtures of investing conserva-
tively. Social anxiety and the presence of an audience also lead to
greater entrapment. Brockner, Fine, Hamilton, Thomas, and Turetsky
(1982) investigated the notion that factors like the presence of an
audience and information about costs have different impacts at dif-
ferent stages in the entrapment process. They found that cost infor-
mation had effects on degree of entrappment when the information was
introduced early in the process. The perceived presence of an audience
affected entrapment when the audience was introduced late in the pro-
cess.
It is possible for executives promoting a course of action to
encourage escalating commitment and entrapment through the manipulation
of information. The information they provide may cause contributors to
attribute failures to exogenous causes (Staw and Ross, 1978), to use a
noncalculating strategy (Conlon and Wolf, 1980), to neglect investment
limits (Brockner, et al. , 1979), to consider the advantages of invest-
ing large amounts (Brockner, et al., 1981), and to ignore information
about costs (Brockner, et al., 1982).
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Summary
Thus far, it has been argued that concepts from behavioral decision
theory can be helpful in understanding the process by which commitment
to a course of action is created and maintained. Since executives
always control at least some of the information received by contribu-
tors, they can manipulate this information to increase contributor's
confidence in a course of action and their commitment to it. The
material discussed previously suggests that executives may do this by
providing large amounts of vivid anecdotal information about them-
selves which presents a consistent picture to draw contributors'
attention away from statistical information related to the probability
of success of the course of action. In other words, the provision of
this type of information can encourage the representativeness
heuristic in contributors and will make them overconfident in their
judgment. The focus on information about the executive will encourage
an "illusion of executive control" over the circumstances. This, in
turn, will lead to higher levels of commitment to the course of
action.
These points are summarized in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here
The behavior of executives like John DeLorean suggest that they do use
vivid anecdotal information to encourage confidence and commitment In
contributors. There is evidence from laboratory and field research
that such Information does affect contributor decision-making.
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The model described in Figure 1 suggests three specific hypotheses
about the effects of large amounts of vivid, personal, anecdotal infor-
mation on contributor decision-making.
1) Such information will lead contributors to focus on the execu-
tive's personal characteristics in making the decision about whether
to contribute to the course of action.
2) It will lead to increased confidence in the course of action.
3) It will lead to increased commitment of resources to the course
of action.
METHOD
To test these three hypotheses, a laboratory experiment was con-
ducted using a financial decision task which has been used in many pre-
vious experiments on commitment. The task is the A&S Decision Case
which is described in several previous papers (Staw, 1976 and 1981;
Staw and Fox, 1977). This is a business case which describes a com-
pany with two operating divisions (consumer products and industrial
products). Subjects play the role of a corporate financial officer
who's duty it is to allocate research and development funds to one of
these two divisions. After making the initial allocation, subjects
receive feedback In the form of statistical data on sales growth and
profitability for both of the divisions for a three-year period
following the initial allocation. Subjects are then informed that $20
million in R&D funds is available to them to allocate to the pre-
viously funded division or to reserve for other uses. This money can
be allocated in addition to a $10 million standard R&D allocation each
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division receives. Subjects then decide how much they will allocate
to the previously funded division and fill out a post-task question-
naire.
Ninety-six upper-division business school undergraduates partici-
pated in the experiment. All subjects received feedback indicating
that in the three years following the initial allocation, sales for
the division had continued to increase but net profits had declined
and the division had experienced net losses in the last two years.
Since the A&S case description points out that profitability is impor-
tant to corporate management, these results in some sense indicate
failure for the division.
In addition to choosing one of the two divisions for the initial
allocation and selecting a dollar amount for the second allocation,
subjects were asked to provide three probabilities. After their ini-
tial choice of the industrial or consumer products division, they were
asked to give their probability that their chosen division would show
positive net profits when summed over the next three years. After
their second allocation decision, they were asked to give their proba-
bility of positive net profits for the next three years with only the
$10 million standard allocation and with the additional allocation
they had just made.
Subjects were also asked to give the reasons they would use to
justify their second allocation decision on a post-task questionnaire
dealing with various aspects of the experiment. These reasons were
used to test the first hypothesis, that personal information leads
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contributors to focus on executives' personal characteristics in
making contribution decisions.
Treatment Conditions
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of three treatment condi-
tions. In the first condition, after their initial choice of the
industrial or consumer products divisions for additional R&D funding,
subjects received feedback indicating their chosen division had failed
to achieve profitability and had sustained increased losses.
In the second treatment condition, in addition to the failure feed-
back on the division they chose for the initial allocation, subjects
received written information that a new R&D manager had been appointed
to the division following its failure to achieve profitability. A one-
paragraph description of this R&D manager was provided. It stated that
he had been identified by an executive search firm, that he formerly
worked for the profitable consumer or industrial products division of
another company, that he was bright, hard-working, and achievement-
oriented, and that he felt profitability was an important goal for the
consumer or industrial products division of the A&S Company. Only
after receiving this information were subjects required to make their
second allocation decision.
In the third treatment condition, subjects received failure feed-
back and a description of the newly-hired R&D manager as did the sub-
jects in the second treatment condition. However, in this treatment
condition, the description was much longer and contained a greater
volume of vivid personal information about the new R&D manager than
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the description given to subjects in the second treatment condition.
This description was designed to provide more detailed vivid material
on each point mentioned in the report given to subjects in the second
treatment condition but not to convey any new information about the R&D
manager beyond that which was received by the subjects in the second
treatment condition. While the description in the second treatment
condition merely stated that the new R&D manager was hard-working,
achievement-oriented, and very competent the description in this treat-
ment condition stated a specific number of hours the R&D manager worked
per week, stated that he had received a high score on an achievement
motivation test, and gave a statement by a former colleague who
regarded him as one of the best in the industry. While the description
in the second treatment condition merely stated that he was interested
in improving the division's profitability, the statement in the third
condition stated that he had written a memo containing specific plans
for improving profitability.
Since the descriptions in treatment conditions two and three con-
tained essentially the same information about the new R&D manager, any
differences in confidence or commitment would have to be due to the
vivid anecdotal nature of the information in the third treatment con-
dition.
RESULTS
The results related to the three hypotheses will be dealt with in
reverse order for ease of presentation. Hypothesis 3 stated that
contributors given vivid personal descriptions of executives will
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contribute more resources to a course of action directed by the
executives. This was tested by using the amount of money committed to
the initially chosen division in the subjects' second investment deci-
sion. These amounts for each treatment condition are shown in Table 1,
Insert Table 1 here
As can be seen from the table, subjects in the "No New Manager" con-
dition invested the least, those in the "New Manager-Pallid Description"
condition invested somewhat more, while subjects in the "New Manager-
Vivid Description" condition invested the most. A one-way ANOVA showed
this difference to be significant (F = 6.94, p < .003). Subsequent
Duncan multiple range tests showed that the subjects given the vivid
description invested significantly more than those given no description
of a new manager (p < .01) and significantly more than those given a
pallid description (p < .05). While those given the pallid description
invested more than those given no description, this difference was not
significant.
Hypothesis 2 stated that contributors given vivid personal infor-
mation will have more confidence in a course of action directed by an
executive. This was tested by using subjects' probabilities of their
initially chosen division's success (positive net profits when summed
over the next three years) given only the $10 million standard alloca-
tion and with whatever additional money they decided to allocate in
the second phase of the task. These probabilities are shown in Table
1.
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From the subjects' assessment of the probability of success with
only the standard allocation, it can be seen that those given the vivid
description of the new manager were most confident, followed by those
given the pallid description and by those given no description. This
difference is in the predicted direction but a one-way ANOVA showed
that this difference was not significant (F = 2.19, p < .12).
In subjects' assessment of the probability of success with their
additional allocation a slightly different pattern is found. Subjects
given the "New Manager-Vivid Description" treatment expressed the most
confidence and those given the other two treatments expressed roughly
the same degree of confidence. A one-way ANOVA found this difference
to be significant (F = 4.69, p < .015). Subsequent Duncan Multiple
Range tests showed that subjects given the vivid description of the new
manager produced significantly higher probabilities of success than
those in each of the other two treatment conditions (p < .05).
Finally, Hypothesis 1 states that contributors receiving vivid
information on an executive's personal characteristics will focus on
these characteristics in making commitment decisions. This hypothesis
was tested by examining the reasons subjects in the "New Manager-Vivid
Description" and the "New Manager-Brief Description" condition gave
for making their second allocation decision. In response to the open
ended question at the end of the post-task questionnaire, subjects in
the "New Manager-Pallid Description" condition gave a total of 94
reasons (an average of 2.94 per subject) while subjects In the "New
Manager-Vivid Description" condition gave a total of 121 reasons (an
average of 3.78 per subject).
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These reasons were divided into two categories: 1) reasons dealing
with the new manager, and 2) other reasons (those dealing with the
division, the company as a whole, or external factors). "New Manager-
Pallid Description" subjects gave a total of 16 statements mentioning
the new manager to justify their second allocation decision. Thus, the
proportion of reasons dealing with the new manager for this treatment
group was .170. "New Manager-Vivid Description" subjects gave a total
of 42 statements dealing with the new manager. Thus, the proportion
for this group was .347. A test for difference between these propor-
tions showed that the subjects given the vivid description had a signi-
ficantly higher proportion of reasons that dealt with the new manager
(p < .003). This indicates that these subjects focused more on the new
manager's characteristics in making their second allocation decision
than did the "New Manager-Pallid Description" subjects.
DISCUSSION
The results of this experiment show that large amounts of vivid,
personal, anecdotal information about an executive provide more
reasons for confidence in the course of action promoted by the execu-
tive. These reasons influence contributors' decisions about whether to
commit additional resources to an organization despite the presence of
pallid statistics showing that the organization's course of action is
not succeeding (hypothesis 1). The results also show that such infor-
mation increases commitment (of funds) to the course of action the new
manager would direct (hypothesis 3).
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However, Che results provide only limited support for the second
hypothesis, that such information increases confidence in the organiza-
tion's course of action. Subjects' confidence i,n the division's success
with only the standard allocation did not differ significantly by treat-
ment (though the differences were in the predicted direction). Subjects
given the vivid descriptions were significantly more confident than
those in the other two treatment conditions that the division would
succeed with their additional allocation. However, since these subjects
also allocated more funds, their confidence might be due in part to
the fact that their initially chosen divisions would have more re-
sources to work with. It may be that subjects given the vivid infor-
mation in this experiment felt that the additional allocation was
essential for the new R&D manager to improve the performance of the
division and that without the additional resources the probability of
success was not improved substantially even with the new manager.
By and large, the data cited at the beginning of this paper and the
results of the experiment support the arguments advanced in the paper.
Those soliciting support for a course of action under their direction
may provide large amounts of vivid anecdotal personal information to
draw potential contributors' attention away from statistical infor-
mation relating to the probable success of the course of action. The
results of the experiment provide support for the assertion that this
strategy is effective. However, since this experiment used a simulated
business decision and student subjects, the results may not generalize
to field settings. The evidence from this experiment should be
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suppleraented with further field research on the effects of vivid per-
sonal information on contributors.
This research extends current efforts to apply the concept of
cognitive heuristics and biases to strategic decision-making. Earlier
efforts (Barnes, 1984; Duhaime and Schwenk, 1985; Schwenk, 1984) have
focused on the effects of individual biases at various points in the
decision process. This paper describes one way in which biases might
interact to reinforce each other.
Further, this paper demonstrates the value of a behavioral deci-
sion theory perspective in understanding and explaining the process of
promoting commitment to a course of action. Since the creation of
commitment is an essential part of the process of leadership, the
behavioral decision theory perspective offers a new view of leadership
and a new basis for suggestions on improving leader effectiveness.
On the other hand, the effective use of this type of information by
leaders may create a condition in which contributors and the organiza-
tion become entrapped in a failing course of action. For this reason,
the use of vivid personal information poses ethical and practical
problems for a leader wishing to create and maintain commitment but
also interested in preserving objectivity on the part of contributors
so that they can check his own tendencies toward entrapment in a course
of action.
-26-
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Table 1
Treatment
N=32/treatment
Dollars Allocated
to Previously
Funded Division
Probability of
Success Without
Added Allocation
Probability of
Success With
Added Allocation
No New Manager $ 8.406 million .45 .57
New Manager
—
Vivid Descrip-
tion
12.531 million .52 .71
New Manager
Pallid
Description
10.0 million .40 .58
Figure 1
The Process of Promoting Commitment
Executive Contributor
Provides
Information
Characteristics:
Personal-
Vivid/Anecdotal-
Large Volume
Representativeness
Heuristic
\_L
Biases:
Overconfidence
Illusion of Leader
Control
\L
Escalating Commitment
Entrapment

